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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

RAY C. JOHNSON and FRANCIS C.
JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
- vs -

Case No. 20622

DONALD ROGERS and NEWSPAPER
AGENCY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants/Respondents.
000O000

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent, Donald Rogers ("Rogers"), adopts the statement of the case recited by appellants, as supplemented by
Newspaper Agency Corporation ("NAC").
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent, Rogers, objects to the factual statement
rendered by the appellants.

This statement reads more like a

closing argument to be given at trial rather than a balanced,
objective backdrop for the legal points in this case.

Many

statements are taken out of context, are incomplete and are
countered by testimony of other witnesses.

The factual picture

of what was going on at the loading dock at NAC and who knew
what - at what time - is, at best, muddled.

Some of the facts

are contested and will have to be resolved by the trier of
fact.

In spite of this, after reviewing all the facts, Judge
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-2Fishler found no contested issues of fact which precluded his
issuance of summary judgment.

All of this is not particularly

relevant to Rogers for purposes of this appeal, however.

The

relevant facts as to him are that he was driving under the
influence and did cause injury.

Those facts are admitted.

Otherwise, the Court is referred to the factual statement of
NAC as a balance to the statement of appellants, with the exception of one procedural fact that relates to the issue of punitive damages.

Between Friends, the bar where Rogers had been

drinking on the afternoon of the accident, was brought into
this action by Third-Party Complaint, under the Dram Shop Act.
Between Friends settled by paying $50,000.00.

Also, NAC made

an offer of judgment in the amount of $125,000.00.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1*

Evidence of intoxication alone is insufficient to

justify an award of punitive damages.
2.

Punitive damages are not recoverable where the defen-

dant has already been prosecuted criminally.
3.

Does Utah recognize a cause of action for emotional

distress to one "within the zone of danger" who witnesses injury to another?
4.

If Utah does recognize such a cause of action, are

the claims of Ray C. Johnson barred by Section 31-41-9, Utah
Code Annotated (1953, as amended)?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Respondent, Rogers, contends that, regardless of whether
this Court adopts the actual malice standard for punitive damages as asserted by NAC, or the lesser standard urged by appellants, Roger's conduct of simply driving under the influence is
insufficient to award punitive damages under either standard.
Under Utah law, conduct must be proved which shows intentional
or deliberate action beyond mere intoxication.
Rogers further claims that punitive damages should not be
allowed in this case since he has already been prosecuted criminally, found guilty and served time in the state prison.
underlying purposes of punitive damages:

The

deterrence and punish-

ment, have already been fulfilled.
Finally, with respect to issues No. 3 and No. 4, relating
to the claim of Ray C. Johnson for emotional distress, Rogers
adopts by reference the argument of NAC made in its brief on
appeal.
ARGUMENT

(

POINT I
EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
{

The only evidence in this case concerning Roger's conduct
in causing the accident is that he was driving under the influence of alcohol.

In that regard, he has admitted that he was

negligent; that his negligence proximately caused the accident;
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-4and has offered judgment to be taken against him and NAC in the
amount of $125,000.00.

There is no other evidence of culpable

conduct, such as excessive speed, recklessness, running a stop
sign or leaving the scene of the accident.

Under the law of

this state and of other states, this bare evidence is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.
The controlling Utah law regarding punitive damages has
been well developed in the briefs of appellants and of NAC;
these cases will not be recounted here.

However, the latest

decision by this Court, Atkin Wright and Miles vs. Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 2 0 Utah Adv. Rptr. 2 0
(1985), merits consideration as it applies to Rogers.

In

Atkin, the Court synthesized the holdings of prior cases
regarding punitive damages and stated as follows:
Before punitive damages may be awarded,
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is
willful and malicious. Leigh Furniture
and Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d
293, 312 (1982); First Security Bank of
Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah,
653 P.2d 591, 598 (1982), Elkmgton v.
Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980);

Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354,
359 (1975), or that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference and disregard
for the rights of others. Branch v.
Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d
267, 277-78 (1982); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution,Utah,
605 P.2d 314, 412 (1979).
Atkins, supra, at 24.
In the case at hand, NAC contends that actual malice, or
conduct which manifests a state of mind consistent with inten-
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-5tional, malicious or a knowing indifference to the rights of
others,

is required.

All parties, including the plaintiffs,

agree that no evidence exists to prove actual malice.

The

appellants assert that reckless indifference to the rights of
others is sufficient.

Rogers disagrees and submits that a

close reading of Atkins warrants the conclusion that simple
reckless indifference is insufficient to serve as a basis for
punitive damages.

In Atkins, the Court first noted the re-

strictive use of punitive damages (deterrence) and then combined the elements of willfulness, maliciousness, knowing and
reckless indifference and disregard to the rights of others as
the bases for punitive damages.

Such a standard implies a

mental or deliberate element to one's conduct not present even
in the term "recklessness."

One who simply drives under the

influence does not meet this standard.
dictions support this conclusion.

Cases from other juris-

In Dillard v. Dillard, 418

P.2d 839 (Ore. 1966), the plaintiff, a passenger, sued his host
driver and obtained a judgment for personal injuries.

Evidence

was adduced at trial that the driver was intoxicated.

After

judgment, the defendant filed for and obtained a discharge in
bankruptcy.

He then attempted to have the judgment expunged,

which was contested by the plaintiff,-who asserted that the
plaintiff's injuries were maliciously or willfully inflicted,
which precluded expungement.

The Court held for defendant and

cancelled the judgment, saying that "the mere fact that one
injures another as a result of driving while intoxicated does
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-6not necessarily establish that the injury was maliciously or
willfully inflicted."

Dillard, supra, at 840.

In Petling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d
208 (1982), a passenger on a motorcycle that was struck by an
automobile brought a personal injury action against the automobile driver, claiming, among other things, punitive damages
because the driver was intoxicated.

The only evidence ever

presented at trial to support punitive damages was that the
defendant was driving under the influence; there were no other
aggravating circumstances.

The Court, on appeal, reviewed

extensively the circumstances and standards which allow punitive damages in Ohio, including fraud, malice, insult, punishing a guilty party for wicked, corrupt and malignant motive or
design, wrongful, unlawful and intentional conduct, together
with recklessness, wantonness and willfulness.

The Court then

stated as follows:
Something more than mere commission of
a tort is always required for punitive
damages. There must be circumstances
of aggravation or outrage, such as spite
or malice, or a fraudulent or evil
motive on the part of the defendant, or
such a conscious, deliberate disregard
of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.
Lacking this element, there is general
agreement that mere negligence is not
enough, even though it is so extreme in 11
degree as to be characterized as "gross,
an unhappy term of ill-defined content,
which occasionally, in a few jurisdictions, has been stretched to include the
element of conscious indifference to
consequences, and so to justify damages.11
Prosser on Torts, 4th ed. (at 9-10).
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-7. . . Allowance of punitive damages
simply because a defendant was intoxicated at the time of an accident, without
establishing causation and without demonstrating intention or deliberation
through, at the least, aggravating circumstances, virtually would impose strict
liability for intoxication in negligence
actions. This would not be in concert
with our well-developed jurisprudence of
punitive damages, and we see no
persuasive reason for taking such a step.
Detling v. Chockley, supra, at 211.
Finally, a recent case from the Fourth Circuit is persuasive as to the facts at hand, although it does not specifically
involve one who was intoxicated.

In Peacock v. J. C. Penney,

764 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff's wife was killed
when she rear-ended a stalled truck, which had been leased by
the defendant.

The driver had encountered mechanical problems

and had pulled off to the side of the road, but did not post
flares and did not waive off oncoming traffic.

The plaintiff

established at the trial that the defendant had no safety training program to train the drivers what to do in the event of a
breakdown, which was required by law; that the truck had no
under-ride protection in the back of the truck; and that the
defendant knowingly misrepresented the fact that the warning
flashers were on, when in fact they were not.

Based on this

aggravated set of facts, the plaintiff sought punitive damages,
which the Court denied, stating:
Exemplary damages are allowable only where
there is misconduct or malice, or such recklessness or negligence as evidences a
conscious disregard of the rights of others.
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-8But where the act or omission complained of
is free from fraud, malice, oppression or
other special motives, or of aggravation,
damages by way of punishment cannot be
awarded and compensatory damages are only
awarded. Baker v. Marcus, infra, at 621.
(Emphasis added.)
For additional cases with similar holdings, regarding
driving under the influence, see:

Smith v. Sayles, 637

S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303
S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1957); Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114
S.E.2d 617 (1960); Eubank v. Spencer, 203 Va. 923, 128 S.E.2d
299 (1962); Bethel v. Janis, 597 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. S.D.
1984); Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585 (D.C. App. 1947).
In the case at hand, respondent Rogers is accused of
simply driving under the influence.

There is no other culpable

conduct whatsoever which is sufficient to warrant punitive
damages.
POINT II
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE WHERE
THE DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY BEEN PROSECUTED CRIMINALLY.
The basic purposes of punitive damages are punishment and
deterrence.

These are acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court

in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179,
1186 (Utah 1983);
(P)unitive damages are not intended as
additional compensation to a plaintiff,
(and) must, if awarded, serve a societal
interest of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is
not likely to be deterred by other means.
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-9See also, Terry v, Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314, 328 (Utah
1979), overturned for other reasons.
No Utah law exists on the point of whether punitive damages are allowable after a defendant has been punished criminally.
ed.

The law from other jurisdictions is rather old and dividSee J. Ghiradri and J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law

and Practice, Sections 5.32-5.33 (1984).

Rogers contends that

the law holding that punitive damages are not recoverable once
a defendant has been punished criminally should be applied in
this case.
point.

The case law from Indiana is instructive on this

In Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. Ct. App.

1978) , the plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile collision.

The plaintiff also sought punitive damag-

es on the basis that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol and had left the scene of the accident.

The

defendant moved for summary judgment as to the claim of punitive damages because he had previously been convicted for and
sentenced on the charge of reckless driving.

The lower court

granted summary judgment on the basis that the criminal conviction barred a claim for punitive damages.
affirmed.

The appellate court

In rendering its decision, the Court quoted at

length from a prior Indiana Supreme Court decision, Taber v.
Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325 (1854):
Where the defendant is sued for the commission of a tort, such as slander, an
offense not the subject of criminal
punishment, the rule that gives damages
to punish the offender, may, with some
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-10degree of propriety, be applied, because
it is the only mode in which, by public
example, the various rights in community
to personal security and private property
can, under the sanction of law, be protected from injury and outrage. In such
a case, there is wisdom in permitting a
jury to 'blend together the interest of 1
society and of the aggrieved individual.
But there is a class of offenses, the
commission of which, in addition to the
civil remedy allowed the injured party,
subjects the offender to a state prosecution. To this class, the case under
consideration belongs; and if the principle of the instruction be correct,
Taber may be twice punished for the same
assault and battery. This would not
accord with the spirit of our institutions. The Constitution declares that,
•no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense;1 and though that
provision may not relate to the remedies
secured by civil proceedings, still it
serves to illustrate a fundamental principle inculcated by every well-regulated
system of government, viz., that each
violation of the law should be certainly
followed by one appropriate punishment
and no more.
In the case at hand, Rogers was found guilty of negligent
homicide, was sentenced to one year in the state prison and,
thereafter, served one year in a half-way house.

Clearly, he

has been both punished and deterred; thereby fulfilling the
purposes of punitive damages.
If this Court should determine, however, that punitive
damages can be assessed, even though he has been punished criminally, Rogers then submits that this Court should follow the
lead of the Supreme Court of Maine, holding that a fact finder
may consider whether criminal liability has been imposed as one
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-11factor in determining whether an award of punitive damages
would serve a meaningful deterrent function.

See Hanover

Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156 (Me. 1983).

See also

White v. Taylor, 157 Ga. App. 328, 277 S.E.2d 321 (1981).
The rationale of these cases is applicable when considered against the backdrop of Utah law governing driving under
the influence.

As noted by the appellants in their brief, Utah

has one of the most stringent statutes in the nation governing
drinking and driving.

The presumptive level is continually

being lowered and now is at .08 percent.
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

See Section 41-6-44,
It is, therefore,

possible for one to be convicted in Utah under a lower presumptive level, where the same person would encounter no difficulty
in a sister state with a higher presumptive level.

Also, the

Legislature recently enacted the Victim Restitution Fund, which
mandates that a driver who is convicted of driving under the
influence must pay $100.00 into the Fund, in addition to the
fine and possible jail sentence which may be imposed against
him.

See Section 41-25-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended).
Considering the severity of these criminal sanctions,
which are designed to punish and deter a criminal defendant, it
is only fair and just for a fact finder to be able to consider
the criminal penalties already meted out as possible mitigating
factors in assessing punitive damages in a civil case.
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CONCLUSION
In present-day litigation, punitive damages are alleged
with increasing frequency.

A clear standard is required which

limits their use to situations which are truly egregious.
Simply driving under the influence is insufficient.

Some fur-

ther conduct and/or deliberate action is necessary to award
punitive damages.

Furthermore, punitive damages should not be

available where a defendant has already paid the price of criminal sanctions, especially in Utah where the presumptive level
is low and the sanctions are high.
society.

Rogers has paid his debt to

Nothing further by way of deterrence and punishment

is needed.

If the jury is allowed to consider punitive damages

under these circumstances, the evidence of the criminal penalties should be introduced as mitigating factors.

Justice can

then be done by a jury familiar with all the facts.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 0th day of December, 1985.

pMz{iV4^F. Keith Nelfeon '
Attorney for Respondent,
Donald Rogers
Suite 7 00 CSB Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
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